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2.1  Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to develop a framework for accounting for 
transfer payments for the household sector and for estimating the effect 
of  transfers  on the  distribution  of  income  by  size and  by  selected 
socioeconomic characteristics, primarily for the year  1972, for which 
relatively complete and consistently estimated data exist. Section 2.2 
discusses the accounting framework and some of the problems in distin- 
guishing between income arising from production and that arising from 
income redistribution, or payments (and receipts) of transfers. The no- 
tion is that in an accounting system for the economy as a whole, although 
not necessarily for any individual sector of  it, transfer payments simply 
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redistribute  claims  to  income  produced,  without  raising  the  total. 
Perhaps this is little more than a definition-although  the indirect effect 
of transfers and taxes on production may well affect the level of  produc- 
tion, a topic beyond the scope of  this paper.’ 
Section 2.3 gives a brief description of  the microdata file-the  fully 
estimated Exact Match-Statistical Match (EM-SM) file for 1972-from 
which the redistributive  effects of  transfers have been estimated and 
explains some of the further adjustments to the file that make possible the 
estimates presented in section 2.4. The basic microdata file used is fully 
corrected for under- and nonreporting of income, and the aggregates for 
particular income types are consistent with the aggregates for the corre- 
sponding income types included in  total money and family personal 
income  as estimated in  the National Income and Product Accounts 
(NIPA). A more complete account of the file is provided in appendix A. 
Estimates of pre- and after-tax and transfer distributions are presented in 
section 2.4, although we should note that the estimates for taxes are not 
of the same quality as the other income and transfer components in the 
file. 
While redistributive transfers are made by  business, nonprofit, and 
household sectors of  the economy, in addition to the government, the 
government is  by  far and away the most important.  Two  comments 
should be made at this point. First, our paper discusses government 
redistribution through the tax and transfer system, not all of  its redis- 
tributive activities taken as a matter of  deliberate policy, such as agri- 
cultural price supports, which raise the (pretax and transfer) incomes of 
farmers.  Second, size  and  other distributions of  pretax  and transfer 
income concepts (such as our earnings and production-related income) 
should not be viewed as those that would have been generated in the 
absence of  government activities and policies. The latter affect the de- 
mand for and supply of products and productive services in a variety of 
ways and, as a result, the wage and rental rates underlying our estimates 
of pretransfer incomes.z 
2.2  An Accounting Framework for Transfers 
In this section we develop a framework for the alternative income 
concepts used in this paper and their relation to an accounting framework 
for transfer payments for households. Our discussion will be restricted to 
the household sector; the development of  an accounting framework for 
the economy as a whole and its various sectors is the subject of the Eisner 
paper in this volume. Our household sector is more narrowly defined 
than the traditional personal sector in the NIPA: for one thing, it ex- 
cludes nonprofit  institutions,  such as philanthropic organizations; for 
another, its coverage is limited to units eligible for interview in census 
field surveys. Thus, the institutionalized population, military personnel 39  Accounting Framework for Transfer Payments 
on post and overseas, civilians overseas, and decedents (persons who 
died before the survey week but whose incomes in the previous year were 
included in the income aggregates for that year) are excluded from the 
estimates. 
Private insurance companies and uninsured pension funds, it should be 
noted, are included in the NIPA business sector, not its personal sector. 
Also, following the NIPA treatment, we include estates and trusts as part 
of the household sector and impute property income received by estates 
and trusts from the business and government sectors directly to benefi- 
ciary households, whether the income received by  estates and trusts is 
paid out to beneficiaries or retained by the estate or trust for the latters’ 
benefit. 
2.2.1  Definitions of  Transfer Income and Income from Production 
There appears to be general agreement that transfer  payments are 
defined as payments made for which there is no quid pro quo, that is, 
nothing of  value is provided in exchange. Ingvar Ohlsson (1953, p. 13) 
refers to such transactions as “independent” or one-way, as contrasted 
with “combined” or two-way transactions in which there is an exchange 
of equal values. In the context of national income accounting, a transfer is 
“any income, either in money or in value in kind, accruing to persons or 
groups which is not in return for current services or products provided by 
them.”3 Since by definition no current goods or services are being pro- 
vided in return, transfers enter only the income side of the accounts and 
do not affect the product side. For a particular receipt or payment to be 
considered an income transfer, “two tests must be satisfied: (1) it must be 
income from the point  of  view of  the recipient; and (2) it must be a 
payment for which no service or product is provided in return” (Rolph 
1948, p. 329). A failure to meet the first test would be exemplified by a 
capital transfer, such as a gift of  land by one person to another, or an 
insurance reimbursement for storm damage to a residence or an auto- 
mobile. 
The second test  requires  a definition of  production  or productive 
activity. The one adopted by Rolph, and implicit, if  not explicit, in much 
of  the literature, is the use of  real resources, both physical assets and 
human  beings,  to produce  goods and services over  a specified time 
period. It lies behind the economist’s model of  a production function, 
which posits a relation between the flow of  services of  real resources, 
measured in physical units or units of  time (e.g., man-hours), and the 
resulting flow of output. 
2.2.2  Money Income vs. Income in Kind 
Such a definition does not, of  course, set rigid  bounds on what is 
considered productive activity. For one thing, it is generally agreed that 
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markets to be eligible for inclusion in the output measure. We believe 
that the concept of income and product should be extended beyond that 
embodied in market transactions, although we  do not attempt in this 
paper to determine the appropriate boundaries for inclusion of  in-kind 
income. Although the boundary must be justified by the purpose of  the 
particular study, we would probably draw it before reaching such fron- 
tiers of  imputation as home production and leisure time. 
Imputed income types for which we do have estimates, in particular 
those imputations that are part of NIPA and included in personal income, 
are also included in our empirical distributions, specifically, wages in 
kind, imputed food and fuel consumed on farms, imputed rent on owner- 
occupied dwellings, and imputed interest. From a distributional stand- 
point, the inclusion of imputed rent is necessary to give equal treatment 
to the owners of  rented structures and owners who live in their own 
dwellings without any payment of cash rent. An argument similar to that 
for imputed rent  can be  made for the inclusion of  imputed interest. 
Investors have the option either of  investing in physical and financial 
assets directly or of  acquiring claims to such assets indirectly through 
holding the deposits or claims of  financial intermediaries. If  investors 
select the latter option, they give up part of the interest return they would 
otherwise have received as an implicit payment for the services of  such 
intermediaries. Imputing a value for these services and adding it to the 
return of those holding claims on financial intermediaries is one way of 
providing equivalent distributional treatment for the two groups of inves- 
tors. Alternatively, one could deduct the (imputed) value of  the equiva- 
lent services that those who invest directly provide for themselves, if such 
estimates existed. 
Perhaps imputed wages are defined too narrowly in the NIPA. We see 
no objection, if estimates of their distribution were available, to broaden- 
ing the concept to include other kinds of employee perquisites, particu- 
larly those enjoyed by many executives. Employer contributions to social 
insurance and private pensions and welfare funds (including group health 
and life insurance) are already included in employee compensation in the 
NIPA, although under the heading of supplements to wages and salaries 
rather than imputed wages. We confine our empirical work to wages and 
salaries, not on principle, but because we lack estimates of  the distribu- 
tion of  supplements by income size. 
2.2.3  Capital Gains and Losses 
Capital gains and losses present another problem in defining produc- 
tion, since they do not appear to fit nicely with the notion of  creation of 
values through the use of real resources. Insofar as these gains arise from 
changes in expectations of the future earning power of existing assets and 
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there is a good case for their inclusion. Such inclusion is particularly 
appropriate for income distribution measurement, since such gains are 
important in determining the relative well-offness  or position of different 
households and groups in the distribution. We exclude them, not as a 
matter of principle, but simply because we have no comprehensive esti- 
mates of  their distribution in our microdata file.4 
2.2.4  Interest Payments 
One of  the more controversial issues in national income accounting is 
the treatment of interest: Are such payments to be viewed as transfers or 
as payments for productive ser~ices?~  Under current accounting methods 
employed in the NIPA, interest payments do not affect the size of  net 
national product (NNP); interest is not treated as the purchase  of  a 
separate service which produces  a value in  addition  to that  already 
included on the product side. A residence, for example, does not render 
any more housing services to its occupant  simply because there is a 
mortgage held against it on which interest must be paid. Viewed from the 
income side, interest is simply a transfer or redistribution of  business 
income or income arising from the rental of physical assets (e.g., dwell- 
ings). Similarly, government output is measured independently of  gov- 
ernment interest paid. While it has often been argued that government 
output is understated by  the omission of  the value of  the services of 
government-owned capital, it is usually not proposed to measure such 
services by interest paid on government debt.6 
This does not mean, of  course, that (net) interest paid, whether by 
business or government, should be excluded from a measure of income 
receipts simply because it does not give rise to independent values on the 
product side. The important issue is whether the totals for the various 
income types have been measured correctly, for example, whether busi- 
ness or rental incomes are shown net of interest paid if  interest is shown as 
a separate income share (an application of Rolph’s “deduct-add” rule), 
rather than whether the resulting interest (or dividend) share is to be 
called a productive payment of some sort or other, or simply what it is, a 
transfer payment. 
2.2.5  Consumer Interest 
One further problem is presented by  consumer interest paid. In the 
NIPA such interest (“personal interest paid to business”) is no longer 
included in NNP in consumer expenditure, but is treated as a separate 
allocation of  personal income, along with personal taxes, consumption 
expenditure, net foreign remittances, and personal  savings.’ Personal 
interest income is thus gross of  such interest paid by consumers, rather 
than net. Given the fact that interest does not represent the value of some 
additional services purchased by  consumers (otherwise it would be in- 42  Edward C. Budd/Daniel B. Radner/T.  Cameron Whiteman 
cluded on the product side), it should be deducted from interest paid for 
purposes of  showing the correct relative distribution of  income among 
households. This can be seen most easily in connection with one form of 
consumer interest: installment credit to finance purchases of  consumer 
durables. Suppose that Jones is sufficiently well-off to purchase an auto 
and finances it by  reducing his holdings of  other financial assets (e.g., 
savings deposits; shares in money market  funds), thus foregoing the 
interest he would otherwise have received on those financial claims. 
Smith, on the other hand, finances the purchase of  an identical auto 
through a loan either because (a) his net worth or wealth is insufficient, or 
(b) he chooses not to liquidate any of  his financial assets and borrows 
instead. Unless we deduct the interest paid by Smith from the interest he 
receives,R  we will show Smith, on the basis of  this consideration alone, 
just as well-off as Jones in case (a) and better-off than Jones in case (b). 
An identical argument can be made for borrowing against future earning 
power, or for loans used to purchase financial assets, for example, stocks 
purchased on margin accounts where the margin buyer is simply paying 
over to the broker part of his dividend income from the stock purchased.y 
Of  course, if  the product side were to include imputed rental income 
from ownership of  consumer durables such as autos, there would be no 
need  to deduct the corresponding consumer interest  paid; the latter 
would simply be a transfer to the creditor of  part of  the imputed rent 
(calculated gross of  interest paid) from the durable, just as mortgage 
interest represents a transfer to the mortgage holder of  income arising 
from the imputed rental value of owner-occupied dwellings. To return to 
our example of  Jones and Smith, accounting for the imputed rental 
income of  both persons and deducting the interest paid by  Smith from 
Smith’s  rental income would show their correct relative income positions: 
Jones would have more net imputed rental income from the auto than 
would Smith. This is exactly the procedure followed in calculating net 
rental income from owner-occupied housing. 
It might be noted that our accounting rules for interest are consistent 
with generally agreed on accounting rules for calculating  net worth, as the 
difference between the value of a person’s assets minus the value of his or 
her liabilities (debts and loans). Thus, if  we draw up balance sheets for 
Jones and Smith, we should include Smith’s installment loan among his 
liabilities, regardless of how we choose to account for consumer durables. 
Thus, Smith’s net worth would always be shown correctly as less than 
Jones’s, whether or not we  choose to include the automobiles each of 
them owns among their assets. Obtaining a measure of  net property 
income consistent with the measurement of net worth requires deducting 
consumer interest paid from total interest received even in the case where 
both the income and net worth concepts omit consumer durables and the 
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2.2.5  Transfers in Kind and Collective Consumption 
Just as with income from production, transfers may take the form of 
in-kind benefits-goods  or services furnished free of  charge by govern- 
ment to households, or whose cost is reimbursed in whole or in part by 
government when purchased by households in the market place. Again, 
there is a good case in principle for including such transfers in recipients' 
incomes and in practice for drawing the line among types to be included 
or excluded in ways similar to those for earnings in kind. For example, 
employing sweeping definitions of in-kind transfers, but unduly limiting 
types of in-kind income included in earnings, particularly those received 
by upper-income earners, will bias the resulting size distribution toward 
equality, or distributions by socioeconomic characteristics toward those 
groups more heavily reliant on transfer income than on earnings. 
There is, however, a major difference between the two types of in-kind 
income: many in-kind earnings types are not  now  included in  NNP, 
primarily because they are treated as intermediate products when paid 
for by employers (e.g., business lunches); in-kind transfers, on the other 
hand, are already counted on the product side as government purchases 
of goods and services or collective consumption (e.g., school lunches). 
The problem for government purchases then becomes one of determining 
which ones to classify as in-kind transfers and allocable to individual 
beneficiaries, and which ones as collective consumption and in principle 
not allocable, or, if allocated anyway, distributed in an essentially arbi- 
trary way, as was done in many of the earlier studies of the redistributive 
effects  of  government  budgets  (e.g.,  Gillespie  1965; Reynolds  and 
Smolensky 1977). The closer the goods are to pure public goods (e.g., 
national defense; creation of new knowledge), the weaker is the case for 
treating them as in-kind transfers. External effects generated by govern- 
ment  expenditures  on  such  potentially  excludable  and  appropriable 
goods as education also complicate the problem. We include as in-kind 
transfers food stamps and Medicare, since they are part of  NIPA's per- 
sonal income and we have estimates of  their distributions in our file; we 
would also include such things as Medicaid, public housing benefits, and 
rent subsidies if  estimates in our file were available. A borderline case is 
furnished by  education: it  is farther along the continuum toward the 
conceptually unallocable pure public goods case, but there are specific 
beneficiaries who gain more than the public at large from such expendi- 
tures. For empirical work, part of  the issue of  inclusion must turn on 
whether there is enough information in the microdata file used to permit 
an estimate of their distribution on the basis of  other than arbitrary, ad 
hoc assumptions. 
Since the papers in this volume by Smeeding, and Olsen and York are 
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that issue here. Our aggregate income controls for food stamps and 
Medicare are based on their cost to the government. 
2.2.7  Tax Expenditures 
Treating tax expenditures as in-kind transfers presents further prob- 
lems. If  the concern is only with the complete post-tax and transfer 
income distribution, it is unnecessary to take separate account of  tax 
expenditures, since the final size distribution will already reflect the lower 
taxes paid by the beneficiaries of  such expenditures. 
If, on the other hand, the purpose is to show a pretax, post-transfer 
distribution (including tax expenditures as in-kind transfers), or to isolate 
the separate distributional effects of  particular tax expenditures, esti- 
mates are needed. If, however, one then wants to arrive at the final 
post-tax and transfer distribution of  income, some hypothetical, refer- 
ence, or “counterfactual” tax function must be estimated and imposed 
that would, in the light of  the tax expenditures assigned to recipients, 
achieve the final distribution, Of course, to derive the counterfactual tax 
function  one could fall back  on the expedient  of  simply adding tax 
expenditures assigned to recipients to the actual taxes they pay. This 
expedient might make  more  sense and  result  in fewer difficulties if 
income tax rates were proportional rather than, as in  our economy, 
progressive. 
2.2.8  Private Insurance 
Most  private  insurance is designed to provide  financial protection 
against catastrophic events, whether to property or persons. Insurance 
compensation for property damage, for example, a house lost in fire or an 
auto demolished in an accident, is simply a capital transfer, designed to 
make good a capital loss suffered by the claimant, and not part of his or 
her current income. 
Households also purchase insurance to provide protection against loss 
of  income, for example, life and disability insurance. In this case, we 
would  add  continuing  benefits  paid,  such  as  private  annuities  and 
monthly disability payments (although not lump-sum settlements, which 
should be treated as capital transfers), and deduct premiums paid (net of 
insurance company operating expenses) from the post-transfer income 
concept (e.g., our household disposable income). This treatment corre- 
sponds with the way social insurance is handled in NIPA’s definition of 
personal disposable income: social insurance benefits (e.g., Social Secur- 
ity, unemployment compensation) are included; personal and employer 
contributions to social insurance funds are excluded. 
Another form of private insurance covers extraordinary expenses, such 
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illness. Benefits from this kind of insurance we would exclude from pre- 
and post-transfer income (and include premiums paid). Of course, having 
incurred a $10,000 medical bill for a serious illness, Jones is better-off if 
he has insurance that will reimburse him for the bill than if  he does not. 
However, in size distributions we  are comparing, not Jones’s position 
with  and without  insurance  coverage for extraordinary expense, but 
Jones’s position with that of others like Smith, who has remained healthy 
during the same period and hence received no settlement. It would be 
difficult to maintain, other things equal, that Jones is better-off than 
Smith to the extent of the $10,000 reimbursement. Indeed, this is one of 
the reasons we assign Medicare benefits as an imputed premium to all 
those eligible and not as benefits to those actually receiving health care. 
(The other is that we have no way of distinguishing  between the ill and the 
healthy aged in our file.) 
2.2.9  Pre- and Post-Transfer Income Concepts 
Our various income concepts are defined more precisely in table 2.1 , 
and the aggregates for selected income and transfer types (for somewhat 
broader categories than in table 2.1) contained in our microdata file (the 
fully estimated EM-SM file) are shown in table 2.2. A description and 
rationale for each, together with a comparison with alternative concepts, 
is presented below. 
It should perhaps be reemphasized that the accounting framework 
represented in these tables is restricted to the household sector. In an 
accounting system for the economy as a whole, by  definition transfers 
paid must  be equal to transfers  received; since the algebraic sum of 
transfers paid and received equals zero, the economy’s pretransfer in- 
come aggregate must equal its post-transfer income aggregate. On the 
other hand, since a sector’s receipts from transfers may exceed or fall 
short of  its payments of  transfers to other sectors, there is no necessary 
relation between  its pretransfer  and post-transfer  income aggregates. 
Thus, no particular significance should be attached to the virtual equality 
of  our pre- and post-transfer concepts (earnings and household dispos- 
able income), quite apart from two intermediate concepts (production- 
related income and household income). 
Primary Income or Earnings (EARN) 
Our first concept includes income arising directly from participation by 
household members in the productive process, either as suppliers of labor 
services or as proprietors of  enterprises (farm and nonfarm) furnishing 
their own labor services or the services of  assets under their immediate 
control. It includes wages and salaries plus proprietors’ income, and 
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Table 2.1  Definitions of Pre- and Post-Transfer Income Aggregate 
1. Primary income or earnings (EARN) =  Wages and salaries 
+ Nonfarm proprietors’ (self- 
employment) income 
+ Farm proprietors’ (self-employment) 
income 
+ Money rental income 
+ Imputed rent on owner-occupied 
dwellings (farm and nonfarm) 
+ Imputed wages and salaries 
+ Imputed food and fuel consumed on 
farms 
2. Production-related  income (PRI) =  EARN 
+ Dividends 
+ Money interest received 
+ Imputed interest 
-  Consumer interest paid (exclusive of 
mortgage interest) 
+ Estate and trust income 
3. Household income (HI) =  PRI 
+ Public assistance 
+ Unemployment  compensation 
+ Workers’ compensation 
+ Veterans’ benefits 
+ OASDI benefits* 
+ Railroad retirement benefits* 
+ Government pensions received* 
+ Private pensions and annuities* 
+ Food stamp bonuses 
+ Medicare benefits* 
welfare, and pension funds only because our file does not include esti- 
mates of  the distribution by size of  NIPA’s supplements to wages and 
salaries. 
Net rental income of persons is also included in EARN, since it is more 
nearly  akin  to income  of  unincorporated enterprises, the distinction 
between the two, so far as rental property is concerned, depending on 
whether rental receipts are the major, or merely an incidental, source of 
income to the recipient (Budd 1958, pp. 355-56).  (In the former case, 
such “net rental income” is classified as proprietors’ income originating in 
the real estate industry.) As previously noted, our household sector 
includes the results of  business operations for proprietors, renters of 
property,  and  owner-occupants, not  their  entire  business  activities. 
While there is something to be said for including all the business activities 
of  home ownership in the household sector, as Ruggles and Ruggles 
(1982) have suggested, and perhaps extending it to self-employed pro- 47  Accounting Framework for Transfer Payments 
Table 2.1 (continued) 
4. Household disposable income (HDI)  = 
5. Household disposable income exclusive 
of  net age-related transfers (HDI - 
ART)  = 
6. Production-related income inclusive of 
net age-related transfers (PRI + 
ART) = 
HI 
-  Personal contributions for social in- 
-  Federal personal income tax 
-  State and local income tax 
-  Personal property tax 
+ State income tax refund 
surance* 
HDI 
-  OASDI benefits 
-  Railroad retirement benefits* 
-  Government pensions received* 
-  Private pensions and annuities* 
-  Medicare benefits 
+ Personal contributions for social in- 
surance 
PRI 
+ OASDI benefits* 
+ Railroad retirement benefits* 
+ Government pensions received* 
+ Private pensions and annuities* 
+ Medicare benefits* 
-  Personal contributions for social in- 
surance  * 
*Age-related items. 
prietors and landlords as well, it is not necessary for the purposes of this 
paper.  In  any case,  such an  extension  should not  be  interpreted as 
undermining the case for the rental imputation, nor as precluding the 
handling of interest payments as transfers to other sectors or within the 
household sector itself. 
With due allowance for possible transfer elements included in EARN 
that we cannot extract (e.g., deferred compensation of  employees ex- 
tending beyond the current year; income arising from long-term rental 
contracts), EARN is the closest we can get to a concept of income arising 
from current production and accruing directly to participants without the 
interposition of transfers or transfer-type payments. While there is noth- 
ing analogous to EARN in the NIPA, it is similar to the concept of 
primary income proposed by the United Nations (UN) for the collection 
and preparation of income distribution statistics, differing from the latter 
in its inclusion in primary income of  rental income, which is classified by 
the UN as property  income  (1977,  pp.  1, 11). The United  Nations’ 
proposal to define proprietors’ or “entrepreneurial” income as well as 
rental income gross of capital consumption (whereas ours is net) seems to 
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Table 2.2  Re-  and Post-Transfer Income Concepts for the Household Sector, 
1972 (millions of dollars) 
Total  Money  In Kind 
1. Wages and salaries  624,133  621,690 
2.  Proprietors’ (self-employment) income  78,699  78,358 
a. Farm  18,348  18,007 
b.  Nonfarm  60,351  60,351 
3.  Net rental and royalty income  19,928  7,535  -- 
4.  Primary income or earnings (EARN) [l + 2 + 31  707,583 
5.  Dividend income  21,728  21,728 
6.  Net interest income  40,777  27,779 
a.  Interest income received  60,363  47,365 
7.  Estate and trust income  4,418  4,298 
8. Production-related  income (PRI) 
722,760 
b.  Less consumer interest paid  -  19,586  -  19,586 
-- 
(earnings plus property income) [4 + 5 + 6 + 71  789,683  761,388 
9. Government transfer payments 
a. Non-age-related transfers 
1) Unemployment and workers’ compensation 
2)  Public assistance and food stamp bonuses 
3) Veterans’ benefits 
b.  Age-related transfers 
1) Social Security, railroad retirement, 
2)  Government employee pensions 
and Medicare benefits 














5  1,774 
39,765 
12,009 
10. Private pensions and annuities (age-related)  9,297  9,297 
11. Household income (HI) [8 + 9 + 101  887,424  848,887 
12.  Personal contributions for social insurance 
-- 
(age-related)  -  33,265  -  33,265 
13. Taxes paid 
a. Federal personal income 
b.  State and local 
1) Personal income 
2)  Personal property 
-  127,630  -  127,630 
-  90,956  -  90,956 
-  18,337  -  18,337 
-  17,467  -  17,467 
-  870  -  870  -- 
14. Household  disposable income (HDI) 
[I1 -  12 -  131  726,529  687,992 
Addenda 
Income Concepts for Age-Related Transfer Comparisons 
15. Household disposable income exclusive of net 
age-related transfers (HI - ART) 























30,252 49  Accounting Framework for Transfer Payments 
Table 2.2 (continued) 
Total  Money  InKind 
16. Production-related income inclusive of  net 
age-related transfers (PRI + ART) 
[8  + 9b + 10 -  121  825,774  789,194  36,580 
SOURCE:  Computed from the fully adjusted EM-SM file described in section 2.3. 
Production-Related Income (PRI) 
Our second income concept takes account of transfers arising out of the 
nature and distribution of ownership rights in the economy. Since pro- 
duction originates in and income accrues directly to business firms outside 
the household sector, the transfer of a part of this income to households 
through interest and dividend payments (directly, or indirectly through 
estates and trusts), based on the particular kinds of  ownership rights or 
claims that households have in or on business, must be accounted for. 
Production-related income (PRI) is thus the sum of  earnings and prop- 
erty income. We use the term, production-related income, partly out of 
recognition of  the transfer character of  some privately distributed in- 
come, partly because of the necessity of including interest paid by govern- 
ments to households. Government obligations are bought and sold in 
private markets; owners of debt instruments do not view their holdings, 
or the interest income received from them, differently simply because 
some of  the obligations they own are claims against the government, as 
distinguished from claims on business firms or owners of  rental prop- 
erties. If  one feels it necessary to find a production base for payment of 
government interest similar to that in the private sector, he or she may 
suppose that it is a distribution of  (part of) the income arising from the 
(not-now-imputed) services of  government-owned physical assets. 
In accordance with our earlier discussion of  consumer interest as a 
transfer payment, in calculating PRI we have deducted for each house- 
hold or consumer unit in our file its payment of interest from interest it 
receives, to derive “net interest received,” which may, of  course, be 
negative for individual units. 
While in our view EARN is the preferable pretransfer income concept 
and PRI a concept intermediate between pre- and post-transfer income, 
others, who are uncomfortable with the treatment of property income as 
transfer income, may wish to consider PRI as the appropriate pretransfer 
concept with which our later concepts are to be compared. Our tabula- 
tions  permit  such an alternative  treatment.  We  should also note  in 
passing that in the United Nations’ conceptual framework for income 50  Edward C. Budd/Daniel B. Radner/T. Cameron Whiteman 
distribution statistics there is no concept similar to our PRI. Property 
income is simply added, along with other private and government trans- 
fers, to primary income to obtain the United Nations’ total household 
income. 
Production-related income is the concept by which consumer units are 
ranked for that set of distributions in section 2.4  in which the ranking of 
units is the same for all distributions, in contrast to the other set in which 
units are ranked by  size of  own income concept, that is, the income 
concept on which the distribution is based. 
Household Income (HI) 
Adding other government and private transfer payments to produc- 
tion-related income yields our household income. We restrict private 
transfers to private pension payments, although, as noted earlier in our 
discussion of  private insurance, we would include estimates of  benefits 
paid from private sickness and disability insurance (to replace losses in 
earnings) if  we  had  them, as well  as the imputed  value of  medical 
insurance premiums paid  by  employers.  A similar remark applies to 
receipts of  interfamily transfers. 
With the exception of  the treatment of  capital consumption (noted 
above), consumer interest paid, and the coverage of the institutionalized 
population, which the United Nations recommends, HI is virtually iden- 
tical with the United Nations concept of total household income (United 
Nations 1977, pp. 5, ell,  48). It is also similar to the Census Bureau’s 
total money income (TMI), insofar as the latter concept can be said to 
have  a precise definition;  important  differences are our  inclusion of 
income in kind (excluded from TMI) and our netting of consumer interest 
paid  against  interest  received.  The Bureau  of  Economic  Analysis’s 
(BEA) concept of  family personal income (FPI) differs from HI in our 
netting out interest paid by  consumers and our inclusion of  personal 
contributions for social insurance. So  far as personal  income (PI) is 
concerned, in addition to the differences already noted between HI and 
FPI, there are matters of population and sector coverage and the inclu- 
sion of employer contributions to private health, welfare, and pension 
funds (“other labor income”) in, and exclusion of private pension pay- 
ments from, PI. Further, a number of specific transfers in PI are excluded 
from both FPI and HI, partly for conceptual reasons, partly because of 
difficulties in estimating their distribution by income size. Examples are 
lump-sum settlements of  various sorts (equivalent to capital transfers), 
consumer bad debts, and auto insurance liability for personal injuries. 
It can be argued that HI and concepts similar to it, such as the United 
Nations’ total household income and the Census Bureau’s TMI, involve a 
form of double-counting, since they include both personal and employer 
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resulting from the latter. While this is true in part for HI, in our account- 
ing system-as  well as the United Nations’-household  income is simply 
an  intermediate  concept  between  a  pretransfer,  purely  production- 
oriented income concept (EARN) and a complete post-transfer income 
concept  (HDI); its purpose is simply to show the effect of  transfers 
received  by  the household  sector before taking  account of  transfers 
household pay (including taxes). 
Household Disposable Income (HDZ) 
Household disposable income is simply household income less person- 
al contributions for social insurance and personal (income and property) 
taxes paid. It is virtually the same as the United Nations’ total available 
household income, with the exceptions noted above for differences be- 
tween HI and the United Nations’ total household income. For a com- 
parison with BEA’s personal disposable income, all the previous differ- 
ences noted between HI and PI are relevant as well. In addition, BEA 
deducts estate and gift taxes (essentially capital transfers) and nontax 
payments (on whose distribution we have no information). We have not 
made a further deduction for sales and gasoline taxes in figuring HDI, 
partly because they are components of  indirect business taxes, which 
have already been deducted in going from NNP to national income and 
personal  income and hence implicitly to FPI and our HI, and partly 
because of the quality (or lack thereof) of the data available to us from the 
itemized deductions on individual tax returns.Io 
Income Concepts Associated with Age-Related Transfers (ART) 
One problem in defining transfers is the time period over which the 
receipt of  income and the furnishing of  productive services are to be 
matched. At one extreme, most of  the wages paid on the last day of  a 
month for  a entire month’s labor services ought  to be  considered  a 
transfer, if  for some reason we were interested in measuring income only 
for that one day. At the other extreme, it might be argued that pensions 
are simply deferred compensation for services rendered over one’s work- 
ing life and ought to be counted as payments for productive services if the 
relevant time period were viewed as the entire life of the wage earner. 
One approach might be to measure either the present discounted value of 
future wages (net of  employer and employee contributions to pension 
funds) plus pensions paid, or alternatively, the present value of  wages 
inclusive of  such contributions, but excluding pensions, although, for a 
given rate of  discount, there is no assurance that these two different 
lifetime concepts would come to the same thing. Yet there are serious 
difficulties  in such a lifetime approach, not the least of which are selecting 
the appropriate discount rate and making sense of  the recipient unit 
concept in a lifetime context, unless the unit is taken to be the individual 52  Edward C. Budd/Daniel B. Radner/T.  Cameron Whiteman 
earner. Even apart from these considerations, interpreting a size distribu- 
tion of lifetime incomes for consumer units whose heads are in different 
stages of  their life cycles is no easy matter either." 
In any case, it is impossible for us to resolve these problems with the 
data at hand.  We have therefore  experimented with a more limited 
approach,  showing the  distributional  effects of  using  two  different 
methods of  accounting for pensions and retirement contributions and 
retirement income.'* One way is to include in current income employer 
and employee contributions to age-related social insurance and pension 
plans as employee compensation and to exclude pension payments and 
retirement benefits, both public and private, from transfer payments. An 
alternative accounting treatment is to deduct such contributions from 
employee compensation and add the retirement benefits and pensions 
paid to the current retirees. A comparison of these two different account- 
ing schemes shows only the net effects of age-related transfers (ART) on 
the distribution of current year income, given the age distribution of (the 
heads of) households in the file; it does not show a distribution with a 
consistent treatment of units independent of or standardized for their age 
structure. Indeed, for reasons cited earlier, although our discussion of 
this issue is by  no means complete, we doubt that this can be done. 
Income concepts used in distributional work are more closely related to 
the second accounting scheme than the first. Family personal income is 
perhaps the best example, with the Census Bureau's TMI perhaps a close 
second, although the latter fails to deduct employee and self-employed 
contributions to social insurance from earnings.  In addition, neither 
concept deducts-primarily  for estimating reasons-mployee  contribu- 
tions to private pension plans, although such contributions are of minor 
importance. On the other hand, the NIPA's concept of personal income 
does not give consistent treatment to government and private retirement 
plans-indeed,  to social and private insurance schemes in general. Con- 
tributions to social insurance (including government employee contribu- 
tions to federal, state, and local pension plans) are excluded from per- 
sonal income and the corresponding benefit payments added, whereas 
employer (and any employee) contributions to provide pension plans are 
included in employee compensation and private pension payments are 
excluded. While 'there is a long-standing rationale in the NIPA for this 
treatment, it is of limited use in distributional analysis; indeed, personal 
income is not a concept that can be used without some modification in 
income size distribution work. 
There are two ways to compare our distributions, inclusive and exclu- 
sive of age-related transfers. The first is by comparing the distribution of 
PRI with the distribution that results from deducting from PRI personal 
contributions for social insurance and adding age-related benefits (Social 
Security benefits, Medicare, and private pension and annuity payments), 53  Accounting Framework for Transfer Payments 
denoted as PRI + ART in our tables. The other is to take HDI as the 
base for the comparison, then deduct age-related benefits and add per- 
sonal contributions (our HDI -  ART). Whichever comparison is used, it 
will not be complicated by the net effect of other transfers-government 
transfers which are not age-related and personal taxes. In effect, the first 
method asks: How would the distribution of  PRI look if  we modified it 
only by  including age-related transfers? In the second method, on the 
other hand, we ask: How would HDI be affected if  we were to exclude 
only age-related transfers from it? Judging by the results in section 2.4, 
there is little actual difference between the two methods in the extent of 
change  in  inequality,  pre-  and  post-transfer,  whether  measured  by 
changes in selected quantile shares or by the change in the Gini concen- 
tration  ratio. The implied Lorenz curves for the concepts,  as distin- 
guished from their shifts, are, of  course, quite different. 
Given the data available to us, the comparisons are not based on ideal 
concepts. For one thing, we lack size distribution estimates of employer 
and employee contributions to private pension plans; for another, while it 
would be possible to impute to wage and salary workers employer con- 
tributions for social insurance, we  have had neither the time nor re- 
sources to do so. Thus, the PRI distribution is unfortunately already net 
of employer contributions to social insurance and pension plans, and we 
cannot show their distributional impact. Neither can we add these con- 
tributions back in going from HDI to HDI - ART. For another, our 
division between age- and non-age-related transfers is only an approx- 
imation, although a relatively close one. While nearly all personal con- 
tributions are for age-related programs, a few transfers, such as Social 
Security benefits and veterans’ benefits, could not be separated into the 
two components, given the data in our file. Social Security was classified 
as age-related, veterans’ benefits as non-age-related. 
2.3  How the Estimates Were Made 
This section provides a brief description of the data base underlying the 
tabulations in section 2.4. It is based on the fully estimated Exact Match- 
Statistical Match (EM-SM) file constructed by a joint effort of the Bureau 
of Economic Analysis (BEA) and the Office of  Research and Statistics 
(ORS) of  the Social Security Administration (SSA). 
The starting point was the 1972 Exact Match (EM) file, which was an 
exact match of persons surveyed in the March 1973 Current Population 
Survey (CPS) with (extracts from) their SSA earnings and beneficiary 
records and information from their individual tax returns contained in the 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Individual Master File (IMF). Since the 
amount of  tax return information in the IMF was quite limited, ORS 
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Statistics of  Income file (which has relatively complete tax return in- 
formation), itself exact-matched to SSA earnings records to incorporate 
certain demographic information (age, race, and sex) needed to improve 
the quality of the statistical match. The income types in each return in the 
file were then corrected for the effects of audit by using the results of the 
IRS Taxpayer  Compliance  Measurement  Program for  1972. In  our 
tabulations, wages and salaries, interest, and dividends were taken from 
the EM portion of the file; proprietor’s income, rent, royalties, and estate 
and trust  income, from  the SM portion.  Since state and local bond 
interest does not have to be reported on federal tax returns, its distribu- 
tion had  to be estimated separately by  using the limited information 
available from other field surveys. The earnings and property income of 
nonfilers were taken from the CPS portion of the EM file. All the above 
earnings and property income types were then adjusted so that their 
aggregates would reflect their corresponding NIPA control totals. The 
latter were derived by adjusting the amount of  each income type in the 
NIPA personal income to make it consistent with the CPS population 
universe and income concepts. 
Since most cash transfer payments are not subject to federal income 
tax, they could not be estimated from the tax return part of the EM-SM 
file. The starting point was therefore the CPS portion of  the file, the 
major exception being Social Security benefits. With some minor adjust- 
ments,  the latter were  taken  from  the benefit  portion  of  the Social 
Security administrative record. 
In-kind income, including imputed wages and imputed farm income, 
was distributed by a variety of methods, using information already in the 
EM-SM file, as well as information from the 1972 portion of  the Con- 
sumer  Expenditure  Survey  (CEX) , the latter  incorporated  into  the 
EM-SM file by means of  a statistical match between the CEX and CPS 
portion of  the EM-SM file. Imputed interest on checking and savings 
accounts was  distributed on the basis of  the value  of  asset holdings 
reported by consumer units in the CEX. Imputed net rental income for 
each owner-occupant was estimated from gross rental value and indi- 
vidual expense components (repair and maintenance, mortgage interest, 
insurance, and depreciation), from information from the CEX and con- 
trol totals for gross rent and types of  housing expenditures from the 
NIPA. Medicare benefits were treated as imputed insurance premiums 
for hospital and medical care and a mean amount assigned to each eligible 
aged person. Food stamp bonus values were assigned to eligible units 
based on family size and the number of weeks worked by the head. 
Personal contributions for social insurance were based largely on the 
amount of wages and salaries reported on the tax return and occupational 
and employment information reported in the CPS, with numerous refine- 
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tions by  state and local workers to retirement funds. Federal income 
taxes were taken off tax returns added to the file in the statistical match. 
State and local income and property tax liabilities were estimated from 
itemized deductions for those who itemized, with income tax amounts 
imputed to those who did not itemize, based on amounts reported by 
itemizers. 
A more complete description of  the EM-SM file is given in appen- 
dix A, 
2.4  Pre- and Post-Transfer Income Distributions for 1972 
In this section we present estimates of  pre- and post-transfer income 
distributions for consumer units (families plus unrelated individuals) and 
for selected socioeconomic groups. Relative size distributions and rela- 
tive mean incomes for all units are shown in tables 2.3 through 2.5, and 
relative means and shares for socioeconomic groups are given in tables 
2.9 and 2.10. Estimates for families may be found in appendix B; since 
they  are similar to those for consumer units,  they are not discussed 
separately. 
Table 2.3 gives the income share for each vigesile and the top 1  percent 
in each of the six distributions; table 2.4 shows the corresponding relative 
means. Looking at the first two distributions, shifting the definition of 
income from earnings to production-related income raises the share, and 
hence  the relative  mean  income, of  the bottom  two quintiles of  the 
distribution by 20 percent, reduces the share of  those in the 41st to 95th 
percentile range by 4 percent, increases the share of the top 1  percent by 
over 16 percent, and the share of the 4 percentiles immediately below it 
by 2 percent. The Lorenz curves for the two distributions intersect just 
above the 75th percentile. Because of this fact, not too much stress should 
be placed on the change in a single-valued measure of  inequality such as 
the Gini concentration ratio, although the latter does fall slightly, from 
.49 to .48. The addition of property income to aged units with little or no 
earnings or rental income is a factor in the increase at the bottom, with 
the number of consumer units with zero income falling from 6.5 percent 
to 2.2 percent of all units. Substantial amounts of property income accrue 
to those units at the top of  the distribution, producing the rather large 
increase in the share of  the top 1  percent. 
When the definition is changed from production-related income (PRI) 
to household income (HI), the income share of  the bottom half of  the 
distribution is increased by over 31 percent and by even greater propor- 
tions for the lower parts of the distribution, with the income share of the 
lowest 30 percent of consumer units being more than doubled. The share 
of  the upper half of  the distribution, on the other hand, is reduced by 
about 6 percent, with that of the top 5 percent falling by over 8 percent. 56  Edward C. Budd/Daniel B. Radner/T. Cameron Whiteman 
Table 2.3  Income Shares, Families and Unrelated Individuals Ranked by  Size 
of the Income Definition, 1972 
(percent) 
Percentile  HDI -  PRI + 
Groups  EARN  PRI  HI  HDI  ART  ART 
Total  100.00 
1-5  -  .52 
6-10  .O1 
11-15  .20 
16-20  .46 
21-25  .91 
26-30  1.50 
31-35  2.14 
36-40  2.76 
41-45  3.35 
46-50  3.90 
51-55  4.46 
56-60  5.02 
61-65  5.60 
66-70  6.21 
71-75  6.87 
76-80  7.59 
8  1-85  8.52 
86-90  9.73 
9 1-95  11.67 
96-100  19.60 
100  6.70 
Gini concen- 
tration ratio  .49 
100.00 













































100.00  100.00  100.00 
-  .22  -  .63  -  .25 
1.01  .39  .58 
1.40  .78  1.00 
1.77  1.21  1.39 
2.14  1.70  1.79 
2.50  2.17  2.19 
2.87  2.63  2.59 
3.23  3.09  2.99 
3.61  3.54  3.40 
4.00  4.00  3.81 
4.39  4.46  4.24 
4.79  4.93  4.69 
5.22  5.42  5.16 
5.68  5.94  5.66 
6.20  6.50  6.21 
6.82  7.16  6.91 
7.61  7.98  7.76 
8.66  9.12  8.89 
10.43  10.94  10.82 
17.90  18.66  20.17 
6.14  6.37  7.54 
.40  .44  .44 
The Lorenz curve for HI thus lies everywhere above the curve for PRI, 
implying an overall decrease in inequality; the Gini ratio is reduced from 
.48 to .42. This change in definition adds various government transfers, 
which tend to be concentrated in the bottom half of the distribution. The 
number of units with zero income is reduced from 2.2  percent to less than 
0.2 percent of  all units. 
When the definition is shifted from household income to household 
disposable income (HDI), the share of the lower three quarters of  the 
distribution rises, although by only a little over 3 percent. Even when the 
share of the bottom vigesile (whose share goes from positive to negative) 
is excluded from the calculation, the increase is still only 4 percent. For 
the top 1  percent the reduction is 13 percent. The Gini ratio falls slightly 
from .42 to .40.  These results suggest that the combined effect of personal 
contributions for social insurance and personal taxes is only mildly pro- 
gressive, at  least for consumer units below the top 1 percent of  the 57  Accounting Framework for Transfer Payments 
Table 2.4  Relative Mean Incomes, Families and Unrelated Individuals Ranked 
by Size of the Income Definition, 1972 
Percentile  HDI -  PRI + 
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distribution. These comparisons are, of  course, complicated by our in- 
ability to deduct personal income taxes on capital gains from the distribu- 
tion, which may explain the perverse behavior of the share of the bottom 
vigesile. 
The effect of age-related transfers on the distributions can be shown in 
two ways-by  deducting such transfers from HDI, or by  adding the 
transfers to PRI. When the definition is changed from HDI to HDI - 
ART, the share of  the bottom 45 percent of the distribution falls, while 
the share of  the top half rises. The Lorenz curve for HDI - ART lies 
below the curve for HDI, showing an increase in inequality; the Gini ratio 
rises from  .40 to  .44. In this definitional change, various retirement 
benefits, as well as personal contributions, are excluded, thus affecting 
the bottom of  the distribution substantially. 
When the definition is changed from PRI to PRI + ART, the share of 
the bottom 45 percent of the distribution rises, while the share of the top 
half falls, with the Lorenz curve for PRI + ART  lying above the curve for 
PRI. The two sets of comparisons produce quite similar results, although, 
of course, opposite in sign; the (absolute value of  the) percentage point 58  Edward C. Budd/Daniel B. Radner/T. Cameron Whiteman 
change in the Gini ratio for the two comparisons, for example, is iden- 
tical. 
The above comparisons are based on ranking individual consumer 
units by the size of income for the particular definition employed. Part of 
the difference in inequality between any two income concepts may be the 
result of  the reranking of units when moving from one income concept to 
another. To measure this effect, relative distributions for all six defini- 
tions were recalculated, using the ranking of  consumer units in just one 
concept (PRI) for each distribution. The results are shown in table 2.5. 
Each vigesile in this table is composed of  exactly the same consumer 
units, for example, if Jones and Smith are both in the 5th vigesile based on 
their ranking in PRI, they will also be in the 5th vigesile for purposes of 
calculating shares in the other five income concepts, irrespective of what 
happens to the size of  their incomes when the other definitions are 
applied. 
As might be expected, for each of  the five income types (other than 
PRI, of course) the degree of  inequality is reduced as compared with its 
corresponding distribution in table 2.3.  The largest differences between 
Table 2.5  Income Shares, Families and Unrelated Individuals Ranked by Size 
of Production-Related Income, 1972 (percent) 
Percentile  HDI-  PRI+ 



































































100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00 
.72  .78  .10  .22 
1.17  1.37  .53  .87 
1.38  1.60  .71  1.19 
1.66  1.91  1.09  1.51 
1.96  2.21  1.63  1.79 
2.26  2.49  2.11  2.14 
2.61  2.84  2.60  2.53 
2.99  3.19  3.07  2.93 
3.42  3.58  3.53  3.37 
3.81  3.93  4.00  3.76 
4.21  4.32  4.45  4.18 
4.64  4.72  4.92  4.63 
5.10  5.16  5.42  5.12 
5.56  5.60  5.93  5.60 
6.08  6.08  6.48  6.14 
6.73  6.69  7.14  6.82 
7.52  7.43  7.96  7.65 
8.66  8.53  9.12  8.81 
10.43  10.18  10.88  10.70 
19.08  17.40  18.33  20.04 
7.06  5.87  6.11  7.52 59  Accounting Framework for Transfer Payments 
tables 2.3 and 2.5 may be found in the lowest part of  the distribution. 
Ranking by  size of  PRI produces  substantially larger  shares for the 
bottom of the HI and HDI distributions, as well as HDI -  ART  and PRI 
+ ART. Differences at the top of the distribution, on the other hand, are 
relatively small. Despite the changes for individual vigesiles, it should be 
noted that a given vigesile never ends up with a larger share than the one 
immediately above it in the distribution. The implied Lorenz curves for 
the five income concepts all preserve their normal shape, that is, their 
slopes are everywhere increasing. 
On the other hand, as table 2.6 shows, substituting the PRI-ranked 
distributions for those ranked by own income concept does not result in 
uniformly increasing the degree of  equality as one moves from EARN to 
HI to HDI. While the extent of  equalization is greater in  the HDI 
distribution as compared with HI when the two distributions are ranked 
by  PRI rather than own income, the opposite is true when comparing 
EARN with either HI or HDI. (Comparisons of the distributions result- 
ing from other concepts with that from PRI are not, of course, affected, 
since by definition the PRI distribution is not altered by reranking.) 
Another way of  looking at the effect of  reranking units when shifting 
from one income concept to another is through a cross-tabulation be- 
tween the two concepts. Table 2.7 contains such a cross-tabulation be- 
tween PRI and HDI by deciles of consumer units. For all PRI deciles, at 
least three-fourths of the units remain in the same decile or move no more 
than  one decile in the HDI distribution. Very few units are shifted 
downward more than one decile; more units are shifted upward more 
than one decile. Units in the middle of  the PRI distribution are shifted 
downward much more often than upward. 
Table 2.6  Ratios of Selected Quantile Shares in Earnings, Household Income, 
and Household Disposable Income, Families and Unrelated 
Individuals Ranked Alternatively by  Size of Own Income Definition 
and by Production-related Income, 1972 
(2)  (3) =  (1) x (2) 
HDUEARN 
(1) 
HUEARN  HDUHI 
Percentiles  Own  PRI  Own  PRI  Own  PRI 
1-20  25.33  7.83  1.04  1.15  26.40  8.98 
21-40  1.37  1.24  1.07  1.09  1.47  1.35 
41-60  .97  .95  1.03  1.03  1.00  .98 
61-80  .91  .89  1.01  1  .00  .91  .90 
81-95  .90  .90  .99  .98  .89  .88 
96-99  .94  .95  .97  .96  .91  .91 
100  1.05  1.18  .87  .83  .92  .98 
SOURCE:  Calculated from tables 2.3 and 2.5. Table 2.7  Joint Distribution of Production-Related Income and Household Disposable Income, Families and Unrelated Individuals, 1972 
(percent) 
PRI  HDI Percentile Groups 
Percentile 







































































































































Numbers may not sum to totals because of  rounding. 61  Accounting Framework for Transfer Payments 
It is interesting to ask, what kind of tax (and/or transfer) rate is implied 
by the difference between any set of pre- and post-transfer distributions. 
The difference, for example, between HI and HDI  for any given quantile 
of the HI distribution can be expressed as a tax (actually, a combined tax 
and social insurance contribution) rate for that quantile. The implied tax 
rate for a quantile in HI is equal to one minus the ratio of its dollar mean 
HDI to its dollar mean HI. Table 2.8 shows, in addition to the pertinent 
relative mean incomes (RMI), two sets of rates: one, the (percentage) tax 
rate implied by  the proportional difference between HI and HDI; the 
other, the combined (percentage) tax and transfer rate implied by  the 
proportional difference between PRI and HDI. For each set, rates have 
Table 2.8  Relative Mean Incomes and Implied Tax and Transfer Rates, 
Household Income and Roduction-related Income, Families and 
Unrelated Individuals Ranked Alternatively by Size of Own Income 
Definition and by Production-related  Income, 1972 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
Tax Rates, Units Ranked 
by  Size of: 
Tax Minus Transfer Rates, 
Units Ranked by  Size of 
Income  Income 
Definition  PRI  Definition  PRI 
Per- 
centiles  RMI  Rate  RMI  Rate  RMI  Rate  Rate 
1-20  .19 
21-40  SO 
41-60  .82 
61-80  1.19 
81-95  1.79 
9699  3.04 
100  7.06 
All units  1.00 
Addendum: 
5-20  .25 
12.8%  .25 
10.4  .49 
13.8  .80 
15.9  1.17 
17.0  1.77 
19.0  3.01 
27.3  7.06 
16.4  1  .oo 



















-  361.1% 

















SOURCE:  Calculated from tables 2.3, 2.5, and 2.9. 
KEY  TO  COLUMNS: 
(1) Relative mean income, HI, units ranked by HI. 
(2) Tax rate implied by the proportional difference between HI, units ranked by HI, and 
HDI, units ranked by  HDI. 
(3) Relative mean income, HI, units ranked by  PRI. 
(4) Tax rate implied by the proportional difference between HI and HDI, units ranked by 
PRI in both distributions. 
(5) Relative mean income, PRI, units ranked by PRI. 
(6) Tax minus transfer rate implied by  the proportional difference between PRI, units 
ranked by  PRI and HDI, units ranked by HDI. 
(7) Tax minus transfer rate implied by the proportional difference between PRI and HDI, 
units ranked by PRI in both distributions. 62  Edward C. Budd/Daniel B. Radner/T. Cameron Whiteman 
Fig. 2.1  Tax and transfer rates implied by relative size distributions of 
household income and household disposable income, 1972 
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been calculated for recipient units ranked by pretransfer income (HI or 
PRI) and reranked by post-transfer income (HDI), and for units ranked 
consistently by PRI. Three of  the four tax, transfer rates are plotted in 
figure 2.1, using the data for vigesiles and the top 1  percent. 
For the consistent PRI ranking, the implied tax rates increase uni- 
formly with HI (except for the bottom vigesile in figure 2.1), although, as 
previously noted, the effect is only mildly progressive, except for the top 
1  percent. The rates based on reranked units show the same behavior, 
except for the bottom quintile, whose rate (12.8 percent) exceeds that for 
the second quintile (10.4 percent). This difference is the result of  the 
negative share in HDI of  the bottom vigesile, precluding the calculation 
of a tax rate in figure 2.1; the rate for the next three vigesiles comprising 
the remainder of the bottom quintile is 6.8 percent. 
The net tax (tax minus transfer) rates implied by  the difference be- 
tween PRI and HDI rise more steeply than the implied tax rates for HI, 
although remaining below the latter, even for the top 1  percent; for the 
bottom two quintiles transfers exceed the sum of  taxes and personal 
contributions, and the implied tax rates shown in table 2.8 are negative. 
Little significance should be attached to very large negative rates at the 
bottom; consumer units in this part of the PRI distribution are so heavily 
dependent on transfers, and those transfers sufficiently unrelated to the 
small amounts of  earnings and property income they receive, that the 
concept of an average negative tax rate has little interpretive value. 63  Accounting Framework for Transfer Payments 
Table 2.9 shows relative mean incomes by  socioeconomic groups for 
each of the six income concepts. The largest changes in relative means for 
six groups classified by age of head are for the age 65 and over group, with 
the relative mean for the latter group rising sharply from .35 for EARN to 
.85 for HDI. Of course, the inclusion or exclusion of age-related transfers 
can be expected to have a large impact on the relative mean for those 65 
and over.  The four  youngest age  groups, on the other hand, show 
declines as the definition is changed from EARN to HDI. 
Female  unrelated  individuals, many  of  whom  are aged, show the 
largest change among family type and sex of  head groups-a  large in- 
crease. Other female heads also show a substantial rise. The black group 
shows a decline from EARN to PRI, followed by a rise to HDI, with no 
significant change between EARN and HDI. 
Income shares for the selected socioeconomic groups are shown in 
table 2.10. The impact of the shift from EARN to PRI differs greatly by 
age of  head. The youngest age group shows little change in shares. The 
next three age groups all show a small increase in inequality, whereas for 
the age 65 and over group just the opposite is the case. Only in the 55-64 
group is there evidence of  a Lorenz curve intersection, which, as was 
noted earlier, characterizes the two distributions as a whole. For the 
younger  age groups, the effect of  including property income  in  the 
Table 2.9  Relative Mean Incomes of Socioeconomic Groups, Families and 
Unrelated Individuals, 1972 
Socioeconomic  HDI-  PRI+ 
Group  EARN  PRI  HI  HDI  ART  ART 
Age of  head 
Less than 25  .56  .50  .48  .49  .54  .46 
25-34  1.04  .95  .89  .88  .97  37 
3544  1.35  1.26  1.18  1.17  1.26  1.18 
45-54  1.45  1.39  1.31  1.28  1.36  1.32 
55-64  1.11  1.14  1.12  1.11  1.12  1.13 
65 and over  .35  .56  .80  .85  .57  .81 
Families 
Family type & sex 
Headed by  couples  1.31  1.28  1.24  1.23  1.26  1.25 
Other male head  1.05  1.07  1.13  1.15  1.09  1.12 
Other female head  .54  .56  .69  .73  .68  .61 
Male  .57  .58  .60  .59  .58  .59 
Female  .29  .39  .46  .48  .41  .46 
Black  .67  .60  .65  .68  .69  .59 
White & other  1.04  1.05  1.05  1.04  1.04  1.05 
Total mean ($)  9,955  10,876  12,221  10,258  9,762  11,372 
Unrelated individuals 
Race of  head Table 2.10  Income Shares for Selected Socioeconomic Groups, Families and Unrelated Individuals, 1972 
Group  Percentiles  EARN  PRI  HI  HDI  HDI -  ART  PRI +  ART 
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24.8 Table 2.10 (continued) 
Group  Percentiles  EARN  PRI  HI  HDI  HDI -  ART  PRI +ART 
Race of  head 
Black 
1-40  5.4  5.4  13.9  15.1  11.6  9.3 
41-80  42.9  42.7  41.1  41.6  42.4  42.0 
81-95  33.3  33.3  28.9  28.1  29.9  31.1 
96100  18.4  18.6  16.1  15.2  16.1  17.6 
1-40  8.0  9.6  14.2  15.0  11.6  13.0 
41-80  43.0  41.1  40.0  40.6  42.0  39.9 
81-95  29.5  28.4  26.6  26.5  27.8  27.1 
96-100  19.5  20.9  19.2  17.9  18.6  20.0 
1-40  7.5  9.0  13.8  14.7  11.3  12.3 
41-80  43.0  41.2  40.1  40.7  42.0  40.1 
81-95  29.9  28.8  26.9  26.7  28.0  27.5 
96100  19.6  21.0  19.2  17.9  18.7  20.2 
White and other 
All units 67  Accounting Framework for Transfer Payments 
income  concept  is  relatively small, since these  groups are primarily 
dependent on earnings, particularly wages and salaries; further, perhaps 
not surprisingly, the property income that is received by  these groups 
tends to be positively correlated with their earnings. For older groups the 
opposite is true: property income is more important as an income source, 
and the correlation is reversed-retired  persons and those with limited 
earnings receive relatively more property income than those with larger 
earnings. 
The shift from PRI to HI, on the other hand, produces a uniform 
movement to less inequality for all age groups, with a substantial increase 
in the share of the bottom two quintiles. The change is particularly large 
for the 65 and over group, although the degree of inequality within the 
aged group for HI is still greater than it is within any other age group. 
Going from HI to HDI produces a further reduction in inequality for 
every age group, with the share of  the bottom 80 percent gaining at the 
expense of  the top 5 percent. 
Removing age-related transfers from HDI (Le., comparing HDI - 
ART with  HDI) results in  very little change in shares for the three 
younger age groups, although what change there is suggests a Lorenz 
curve intersection phenomenon, resulting from the greater incidence of 
personal contributions for social insurance on middle income groups, 
which rely more heavily on wages and salaries, on which such contribu- 
tions primarily impinge. As would be expected, for the two older age 
groups there is a movement  toward  more inequality,  especially pro- 
nounced for the 65 and older group. The results in going from PRI to PRI 
+ ART (i.e., adding only age-related-not  all-transfers  to production- 
related income) are virtually the same as those discussed above in com- 
paring HDI and HDI - ART, whether one looks at percentage or at 
percentage point changes in shares, although the relevant changes are, of 
course, opposite in sign. 
In contrast to the effects for age groups, those for family type and sex of 
head groups in general are similar to those for all units. The shift from 
EARN to PRI increases the shares of the bottom and top 5 percent and 
decreases the share in the 41-95  percentile range; that from PRI to HI 
increases the share of  the bottom 40 percent and decreases the shares of 
the groups above it; that from HI to HDI increase the share of the bottom 
80 percent and reduces that of  the top 20. The only exception to the 
direction and extent of  change is for female unrelated individuals. For 
that group the extent of  change is generally greater in moving from one 
concept to another; in addition, the change for the 41-80  percentile group 
sometimes differs in sign, as compared with the other groups. 
The effects for blacks are similar to those for the white and other 
group, except for the shift from EARN to PRI. The shift produces little 68  Edward C. BuddIDaniel B. Radner/T. Cameron Whiteman 
change in the shares for blacks because of the relatively small amount of 
property income received by blacks. 
2.5  Conclusion 
The major purposes of this paper have been to develop a consistent 
framework for the accounting of transfers, as receipts of, and payments 
by, the household sector from, and to, other sectors and to compare the 
effect of  alternative definitions of  pre- and post-transfer income on the 
distribution of  income among households by size and by socioeconomic 
characteristics. We started from a concept of  earnings (wages, propri- 
etors’ income, and net rental and royalty income), then added net trans- 
fers  of  property  income  from  the  business  and  government  sectors 
(dividends received from corporate business, interest received from busi- 
ness and government net of interest paid to business, and estate and trust 
income) to obtain a concept reflecting primarily, although not entirely, 
the results of productive activities, including the resultant distribution of 
property income arising from the underlying ownership of property rights 
by  the household sector. Our resulting concept of  production-related 
income showed less inequality at the bottom, and more inequality at the 
top, of  the distribution than earnings (i.e., a Lorenz curve intersection). 
Household income, another intermediate stopping point between our 
pure  pretransfer  income  concept  (earnings)  and  our complete post- 
transfer concept, added transfers received (government transfers from 
both entitlement and means-tested programs and private transfers), but 
did  not  deduct transfers  paid.  As compared with the two  preceding 
concepts, it resulted in a substantial reduction in inequality at the bottom 
of  the distribution and raised substantially the mean incomes of  those 
socioeconomic groups heavily reliant on transfer income. The complete, 
post-transfer income concept, household disposable income, was net of 
transfers-personal  contributions to social insurance programs and in- 
come property taxes-paid  by households. Compared with the effect of 
adding transfers received, deducting transfers paid had only a relatively 
mild equalizing effect. Although their effects on our concepts are clear 
enough, we were not  able to provide estimates of  the redistributive 
effects of  interhousehold receipts and payments of  transfers. 
Appendix A  Construction of  the Estimates 
The estimates shown in this paper were tabulated from the fully esti- 
mated  1972 Exact  Match-Statistical Match (EM-SM) file, which  was 
constructed in a cooperative effort by the Bureau of Economic Analysis 69  Accounting Framework for Transfer Payments 
(BEA), U.S.  Department of  Commerce, and the Office of Research and 
Statistics, Social Security Administration  (SSA). That file contains esti- 
mates  of  income  produced  by  adjusting  estimates from  several  data 
sources to be consistent with independent control totals derived primarily 
from the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA). The file also 
includes estimates of  several types of  tax liability. The construction of 
that file is described in this appendi~.'~ 
The 1972 Exact Match File 
The starting point for the construction of  the file was the 1972 Exact 
Match (EM) file, which is an exact match of  the March  1973 Current 
Population Survey (CPS), the Internal Revenue Service's 1972  Individual 
Master File (IMF), an extract of  the SSA Summary Earnings Record 
(SER)  ,  which contains earnings covered by  the Social Security system, 
and SSA benefit data. Records from the IMF, SER,  and benefit files were 
matched to CPS records by identifiier linkage variables (Social Security 
number, name, address, sex, race, and date of  birth). About 87 percent 
of  the CPS file was finally matched, and the matched portion was re- 
weighted  to population  control  totals  (Kilss and  Scheuren  1978 and 
discussion  by  Budd). Not  all  records  included  in  the three-way  link 
contain all three types of records. For example, some CPS units did not 
file tax returns. The completed CPS-IMF-SER linked file includes ap- 
proximately 38,600 matched families and unrelated individuals. 
The Statistical Match of  Statistics of  Income Tax Return Data 
with the 1973 EM 
While there is no doubt that the 1972 EM is superior to any individual 
microdata  file hitherto  available,  the absence of  complete tax return 
information is a serious limitation; in particular, tax liabilities and income 
amounts other than adjusted gross income (AGI), wages, interest, and 
dividends in AGI are missing from the file. To rectify this deficiency and 
bring  in  missing information on tax return income types and federal 
income tax liabilities, a statistical match (SM) was carried out between 
the EM  and the 1972 Augmentation File (AF)14  The AF  was a subsample 
of  Statistics of  Income tax returns, which was itself exact matched to SER 
records to obtain age, race, sex, and Social Security taxable earnings, 
primarily  for the purpose of  improving the quality of  the statistical 
matching by adding more good matching variables. The SM was carried 
out in three steps: the initial match, the rematch, and the high-income 
match. The initial match and the rematch were similar matches whose 
purposes were  to add tax liabilities  and more accurate  and complete 
income data to the EM; the rematch respecified and improved the initial 
matching for about 15 percent of the records in the file. The high-income 
match, on the other hand, was performed  to add more high-income 70  Edward C. Budd/Daniel B. Radner/T. Cameron Whiteman 
returns to the statistically matched file to reduce the sampling variance 
for high-income records. 
Twenty-two variables were employed in the match, either for defining 
“cells” within which matching of records was to occur, or for choosing AF 
records within the cells. These variables included  (amounts) of  AGI, 
interest, dividends in AGI, and Social Security taxable earnings; sex, 
race, age, number of tax return exemptions, and presence of various tax 
return schedules. In general, the AF record  whose information  most 
closely resembled the EM  record’s information was chosen as the match 
for that EM rec~rd.’~ 
Correction of Tax Return Income Types for the Effects of  Audit 
The statistical match of the EM and the AF  produced complete tax 
return income type information for each EM  record, resulting in what we 
have previously referred to as the EM-SM file. The next step was the 
correction of  each IRS income type in this file for the effects of audit, as 
evidenced  in  the  1973 Taxpayer  Compliance Measurement  Program 
(TCMP) file. The methodology proceeded along two related lines: (1) a 
ratio correction technique for returns in which income, by type of  in- 
come, went from one amount to another amount, and (2) a net change 
procedure for returns in which the income type was changed from a loss 
to a positive amount, or from “none” to a nonzero amount, the latter 
being of  primary importance for self-employment incomes, rent, and 
interest. Each of  these two procedures was implemented separately, for 
each income type, for eight correction cells based  on the type of  tax 
return filed: joint, and all other; one or more exemptions for age 65 and 
over, and no such exemptions; and short and long tax form.I6 
Final Adjustment of  Taxable Income Types to 
Aggregate NIPA Income Control Totals 
Once the size distribution of  each IRS income type had been esti- 
mated, the final step was to bring the level of each type implicit in the 
EM-SM file up to its corresponding NIPA control total. The control 
totals were derived by adjusting the amount of each taxable income type 
in the NIPA personal income account to make it consistent with the CPS 
population universe and income concepts. Income received by decedents 
(persons who died between 1  January 1972 and 15 March 1973), military 
personnel on post and overseas, and recipients other than persons, such 
as nonprofit institutions, were excluded. For some income types adjust- 
ments were carried out to make the control more nearly consistent with 
the ways in which the type is reported on the tax return. For example, 
interest, dividends, rent, and proprietors’ income paid to estates and 
trusts were transferred to a separate control for estate and trust income, 71  Accounting Framework for Transfer Payments 
since the latter, although not a separate income type in the NIPA, is 
reported separately on Schedule E of  the tax return. 
The blow-up procedure for income types with positive income only (no 
losses) was designed to leave the relative size distribution for each income 
type unaffected. A correction factor, defined as the ratio of  the NIPA 
control total to the aggregate implicit in the IRS data base (after audit 
correction), was applied to each nonzero observation. For income types 
involving loss as well as gain incomes (self-employment incomes, rents, 
and royalties), losses were reduced in roughly the same proportion as 
gains were increased. In addition, for particular tax return types a small 
constant term was added to each record to make the proportion of losses 
more nearly consistent with evidence from other sources on the propor- 
tion of  loss incomes. 
Estimation of  Nontaxable Money Income Types 
Since most types of transfer income are not subject to federal income 
tax, the only estimates for such types are those in the CPS portion of the 
EM-SM records, with the important exception of Social Security benefits. 
For the latter, the amount contained in the benefit portion of the Social 
Security administrative  record was  substituted  for the CPS reported 
amount. This substitution, together with a limited amount of file editing 
and inflation of  individual amounts by less than 1  percent, brought the 
aggregate up to the independently derived BEA control. 
The CPS was the starting point for the estimation of  the remaining 
transfer payments, including railroad retirement, public assistance, other 
government transfer programs (unemployment compensation, workers’ 
compensation, government pensions, and veterans’ benefit payments), 
and  private  transfers  (which  were  limited  to  private  pensions  and 
annuities). For these types of  transfer income, the underestimates  of 
aggregate income in  the CPS appeared to be primarily the result of 
underestimates of  the  number  of  recipients.  The basic strategy  was 
therefore to select additional recipients among the potentially  “false 
zeroes”  (those who responded “none” even though they received an 
amount), rather than raising individual reported amounts. 
Although there were some variations in  the estimating procedures 
among individual program types, the following general steps were em- 
ployed: (1) An income control total was derived from the NIPA estimates 
and adjusted for consistency with the CPS population coverage, and a 
recipient  unit control was estimated for each program from program 
data. (2) CPS nonresidents were reallocated amounts and, where the CPS 
contained only combined amounts, amounts for specific transfer types 
were estimated. (3) Within cells defined by  selected CPS demographic 
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from among nonrecipients to meet the recipient unit controls and were 
assigned amounts reported by  or allocated to recipients. Each person 
drawn had  a greater probability of  being assigned a smaller amount 
reported by a recipient than a larger amount to take account of  the fact 
that in field surveys smaller amounts of  a transfer type more often go 
unreported than larger amounts. (4) For some types, assigned amounts 
were then inflated or deflated (by relatively small ratios) to meet the 
corresponding income control for the transfer type.  l7 
For state and local bond interest, there were essentially no data in the 
EM-SM records. That income type was estimated using several other 
data sources-the  1972-73  Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX), which 
had been statistically matched to the EM-SM file; the 1962 Survey of 
Financial Characteristics of Consumers; and the 1977 Michigan Survey of 
Consumer Attitudes. 
Estimation of  In-Kind Income 
Free food and lodging (included in wages and salaries) were assigned to 
a small number of employees in a few selected industries. Food and fuel 
consumed on farms (included in farm income) were imputed to consumer 
units reporting farm residence in the CPS. The amounts assigned, averag- 
ing $100, were a function of  family size. 
Both imputed rent and imputed interest were distributed on the basis 
of  information collected in  the CEX. A statistical match between the 
CEX and EM-SM files referred to earlier was used to incorporate the 
CEX estimates into the latter file. Size of  consumer unit, race and sex of 
the head, home ownership, size of  total money income, and the size of 
interest income were among the variables controlled for or used in the 
statistical match of  these two separate files. 
Imputed interest on checking and savings accounts was distributed in 
proportion to the value of  these asset holdings reported by  consumer 
units in the CEX. The distribution of  imputed interest on equity in life 
insurance policies was not estimated in this file, and the corresponding 
amount of imputed interest (approximately $7.1 billion) is not included in 
the aggregates in table 2.2. 
The imputation for net rent on owner-occupied nonfarm dwellings was 
based on drawing up an income and expense, or production, statement 
and estimating its components separately for each home owner. Gross 
rental values and home owners’ expenditures on repair and maintenance, 
mortgage interest, and property insurance were estimated from the CEX. 
Imputed  rent  on owner-occupied and tenant-occupied  farm operator 
dwellings was estimated by a somewhat different technique to allow for 
differences in the method used by USDA to estimate aggregate rent, as 
compared with BEA methodology, and was incorporated in net rental 
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Medicare benefits were, treated as imputed insurance premiums for 
hospital and medical care whose full cost was paid by the federal govern- 
ment.  The value of  the full-year imputed  premium  assigned to aged 
persons was $425. 
Food stamp bonus values were assigned to eligible recipient units based 
on the size of  the unit and the number of weeks worked by  the head. 
Average bonus values as a function of  these two characteristics were 
based on reported  values computed from the CEX, as corrected for 
underreporting. Participating units were selected from among eligible 
units, with probabilities of selection a function of the size of the unit and 
whether it received public assistance. 
Estimation of  Personal Contributions for Social Insurance, 
Taxes, and Interest Paid 
Assignments of OASDI tax to wage and salary workers were made at 
the statutory  rate, up to the OASDI taxable  limit, based  on wages 
reported on the tax return and occupational information drawn from the 
CPS. The self-employment tax was assigned to persons filing a Schedule 
SE, based  on the amount of  self-employment income on  the return 
before correction by  audit. The assignment procedure took account of 
any OASDI tax which the self-employed person may have paid on his or 
her wage earnings. Contributions to railroad retirement were assigned at 
the statutory rate for this program. 
Employee contributions to state and local retirement plans were dis- 
tributed on the basis of the tax return amount of wages to those reporting 
such employment in the CPS. Account was taken of the joint coverage by 
both state and local plans and by Social Security of  some workers, who 
were assumed to pay a somewhat lower contribution rate than employees 
covered only by a state or local plan. Retirement contributions of federal 
employees were based on the statutory contribution rate. The method 
used for allocating supplementary medical insurance premiums paid by 
the aged was  virtually identical to that used  in  estimating Medicare 
benefits, as described above. 
Federal personal income tax liabilities were taken without change from 
the tax returns added to the file in the statistical match. The definition 
used was total income tax (i.e., income tax after credits plus minimum 
tax). 
For federal tax returns with itemized deductions, state and local in- 
come tax liability was estimated as the itemized deduction for state and 
local income tax less the state income tax refund. Personal property tax 
liability was estimated as the itemized deduction for the personal prop- 
erty tax. 
For federal tax returns which had nonitemized deductions, itemized 
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were assigned using a hot deck imputation procedure. The assignment 
was performed within sixteen cells based on type of  return (joint, non- 
joint), number of dependent exemptions (0, 1, 2, 3 +), and number of 
age or blind exemptions (0, 1  +). Within each of these cells a return was 
chosen (with replacement) for each nonitemizer. The assignment of the 
items was based on percent of AGI-that  is, if the item was Xpercent of 
AGI in the itemized return, X percent of the nonitemized return’s AGI 
was assigned. All assigned amounts were decreased by about 5 percent to 
bring the aggregate down to the control. 
Because of our resource constraints, units with no federal income tax 
returns were assumed to have no federal, state, and local, or personal 
property tax liability. In addition, it was not possible to estimate and 
deduct that portion of the federal personal income tax which was from tax 
liability on realized capital gains. Deduction of  such tax liability would 
have been desirable since realized capital gains are not included in PRI or 
HI. This fact should be kept in mind in interpreting the results for the 
bottom vigesile for the HDI distributions shown in section 2.4. 
For federal tax returns with itemized deductions, interest paid was 
estimated as the itemized deduction for interest  (excluding mortgage 
interest). For federal tax returns with nonitemized deductions, the hot 
deck imputation procedure mentioned above in connection with taxes 
was used to impute interest paid. All assigned amounts were reduced by 
about 20 percent to bring the aggregate down to the control. 75  Accounting Framework for Transfer Payments 
Appendix B  Tables  for Families 
Table 2.A.1  Income Shares, Families Ranked by Size of the Income Definition, 
1972 (percent) 
Percentile  HDI -  PRI + 
Groups  EARN  PRI  HI  HDI  ART  ART 
Total  100.00 
1-5  -  .47 
6-10  .19 
11-15  .61 
16-20  1.23 
21-25  1.85 
26-30  2.43 
31-35  2.92 
36-40  3.37 
41-45  3.81 
46-50  4.23 
51-55  4.65 
56-60  5.07 
61-65  5.51 
66-70  5.98 
71-75  6.49 
76-80  7.11 
81-85  7.87 
86-90  8.90 
91-95  10.57 
96-100  17.68 
100  6.01 
Gini concen- 
tration ratio  .42 
100.00 

































































100.00  100.00 
-  .44  -  .16 
.84  .94 
1.40  1.47 
1.89  1.90 
2.33  2.29 
2.74  2.65 
3.13  3.01 
3.51  3.35 
3.87  3.68 
4.22  4.03 
4.57  4.37 
4.95  4.73 
5.33  5.10 
5.74  5.52 
6.21  6.04 
6.76  6.62 
7.47  7.34 
8.46  8.37 
10.05  10.09 
16.97  18.69 
5.73  6.91 
.42  .37  .35  .39  .40 76  Edward C. Budd/Daniel B. RadnerlT. Cameron Whiteman 
Table 2.A.2  Relative Mean Incomes, Families Ranked by Size of the Income 
Definition, 1972 
Percentile  HDI -  PRI + 
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Table 2.A.3  Income Shares, Families Ranked by Size of Production-Related 
Income, 1972 
Percentile  HDI -  PRI + 























100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00 
-  .37  -  .37  .90  1.00  .27 
.30  .33  1.58  1.83  .80 
.82  .88  1.86  2.13  1.32 
1.41  1.45  2.05  2.29  1.83 
1.93  1.96  2.37  2.60  2.29 
2.46  2.44  2.70  2.91  2.72 
2.97  2.88  3.05  3.23  3.13 
3.42  3.30  3.39  3.54  3.51 
3.84  3.68  3.68  3.81  3.87 
4.27  4.07  4.01  4.11  4.21 
4.68  4.47  4.33  4.42  4.57 
5.10  4.86  4.69  4.77  4.95 
5.55  5.28  5.01  5.06  5.33 
5.97  5.72  5.43  5.45  5.72 
6.46  6.24  5.89  5.87  6.18 
7.15  6.86  6.42  6.37  6.74 
7.85  7.63  7.14  7.05  7.46 
8.80  8.68  8.13  8.03  8.45 
10.49  10.45  9.70  9.46  9.99 
16.92  19.21  17.69  16.07  16.66 






















6.89 Table 2.A.4 
PRI  HDI Percentile Groups 
Percentile 
Joint Distribution of Production-Related Income and Household Disposable Income, Families, 1972 (percent) 







































































































































Numbers may not sum to totals because of  rounding. 79  Accounting Framework for Transfer Payments 
Table 2.A.5  Relative Mean Incomes of Socioeconomic Groups, Families, 1972 
Socioeconomic  HDI-  PRI+ 
Group  EARN  PRI  HI  HDI  ART  ART 
Age of  head 





65 and over 
Family type & sex 
Families 
Headed by couples 
Other male head 
Other female head 
Race of  head 
Black 
White & other 
.60  .55 
.92  .86 
1.18  1.12 
1.33  1.29 
1.11  1.14 
.45  .66 
1.09  1.09 
.87  .91 
.45  .47 
.67  .61 























.59  .51 
.88  .80 
1.13  1.06 
1.27  1.24 
1.11  1.14 
.66  .93 
1.07  1.08 
.93  .97 
.58  .53 
.70  .61 
1.04  1.05 
Total mean ($)  11,937  12,812  14,203  11,879  11,471  13,220 80  Edward C. Budd/Daniel B. Radner/T.  Cameron Whiteman 
Notes 
1. For a review of the literature on the effects of transfers on labor supply and savings, as 
well as their purely redistributive effects, such as are examined in this paper, see Danziger, 
Haveman, and Plotnick (1981). 
2. For an excellent discussion of the appropriate pretransfer income concept from which 
to measure the redistributive effect of government fiscal policy, see Behrens and Smolensky 
(1973). 
3. Rolph (1948), p. 331. Our discussion of transfers draws heavily on Rolph’s article. A 
criticism of  Rolph’s treatment, which we do not find convincing, may be found in Jaszi 
4. The tax return data in our file do contain data on realized capital gains (Schedule D). 
However, they have not been corrected for audit, as have the other tax return types. Since 
real capital gains  (money gains adjusted for changes  in the  price  level) are the  more 
meaningful concept, it would also be necessary to develop a method for deflating them, no 
easy task  since the underlying  asset values giving rise to such gains, on which such  a 
correction  would have to be  based,  are not  included in microdata files of  tax  returns. 
Further, estimates of  accrued capital gains are not available from this source. Realized 
capital gains are not likely to be a very good proxie for total gains (realized plus accrued) in 
any case. 
5. For a fuller treatment of  this issue than is necessary here, see Ohlsson (1953), pp. 
160-62;  and Rolph (1948), pp. 332-43. Ruggles and Ruggles (1982, pp. 14-16)  present an 
opposite argument. Strangely  enough,  this controversy has not involved dividend  pay- 
ments, which constitute distributions of  corporate earnings (net of  interest and taxes) to 
shareholders. The latter receive such (transfer) income payments because, as legal owners 
of  the corporation, they are entitled to participate in its earnings, not because in some sense 
or  other they  are furnishing productive services to the corporation.  Such transfers  are 
voluntary rather than legally required, in contrast to interest payments which Rolph defines 
as contractual transfers (Rolph 1948, pp. 332, 336-37). 
6.  E.g., Ohlsson (1953), pp. 82-83;  Hagen and Budd (1958), pp. 269-70.  In the same 
volume (A  Critique ofthe U.S.  Income and Product Accounts), Jaszi comments that “the 
decision [to exclude government interest payments] is a matter of  common sense: since in 
practice there is no determinate relation between government interest payments and the use 
of  government property, there is no realistic ground for including these payments as an 
approximation to the services rendered by government property”  (Jaszi 1958, p. 50). 
For an alternative view, see Ruggles and Ruggles (1982), p. 14. Perhaps they would be 
sympathetic with a further argument Jaszi makes, although not with the final conclusion he 
draws: “It is true, of course, that with only moderate ingenuity one could define a factor of 
production, such as lending or abstinence, as standing behind government interest. The 
concept of factor of production is vague in economic theory, and anyone is free to define it as 
it suits him best. But all these interpretations of government interest as a factor payment are 
highly artificial; such interest would be excluded regardless of them in any realistic analysis 
of  resource use” (Jaszi 1958, pp. 50-51). 
7. Interest paid by one consumer to another is presumably netted out as a transfer within 
the personal sector in the NIPA. Even though intrapersonal interest receipts and payments 
are netted out of  this aggregate, their distributive effects should be accounted for in the 
post-transfer distribution. 
8. Of course, net interest received (interest received minus interest paid) could well be 
negative for individual consumer units such as Smith. 
9. Perhaps, as  Ruggles and Ruggles (1982, p. 15) argue, part of the interest payment may 
be hidden in the purchase price of  the car, so that Smith pays a higher price than Jones for 
the identical car. The theoretically correct procedure would be to count the two identical 
(1958), pp. 115-119. 81  Accounting Framework for Transfer Payments 
cars that Jones and Smith purchased at the same price (i.e., with the same weight) in NNP 
and assign the difference Smith pays to consumer interest paid, although empirically this 
would be difficult to do. For this and other reasons, actually observed market prices are not 
always the most appropriate weights for counting individual products in NNP. 
10. The argument that indirect business taxes have already been deducted is compelling 
only if we confine ourselves to the distribution of money income. Excise and sales taxes can 
affect relative wages and prices, and hence relative real incomes, dependingon the composi- 
tion of consumption expenditure of  different households and groups of households (e.g., 
the aged vs. the non-aged). If  one cannot deflate the money incomes of  the relevant groups 
by price indexes which incorporate the effects of indirect taxes, the next best thing may be to 
deduct the taxes from each household’s income. 
11. For an excellent discussion of  the issues associated with lifetime income accounting 
and, among other things,  its relation  to Social Security and age-related  transfers,  see 
Taussig (1976), pp. 34-42. 
12. Social Security benefits are included along with pensions in retirement benefits. It is 
true that OASDI was originally conceived as a social insurance program which would insure 
covered workers against the loss of  earnings because of  age as well as other factors causing 
partial or total disability. However, it is well known that the problem of  “moral hazard” is 
even greater for an age-related program such as Social Security than for other forms of 
insurance. Thus, workers may voluntarily retire, from age sixty-two on, and receive Social 
Security benefits, even though many could keep on working with possibly little loss of 
earning power.  Mandatory  retirement schemes and other institutional restrictions also 
complicate the interpretation of  moral hazard in connection with Social Security. Here we 
simply assess the effects of  Social Security when interpreted as a retirement  system and 
leave aside its other elements. 
13. This appendix draws heavily on a description by  Budd and Salter (1981) of  the 
EM-SM file and the methods used in its creation. 
14. In  a statistical match, observations in different files are matched on the basis of 
similar characteristics, rather than personal identifying information. Only in rare cases do 
the observations matched represent the same person. 
15. A more complete discussion of  the statistical match may be found in Radner (1981) 
and Salter (1980), chap. 6. 
16. For a more complete discussion of  the audit correction, see Salter (1980), chaps. 7 
and 8. 
17. While the work on public assistance was hampered by the absence of  information on 
which particular program the respondent participated in, the results of  a detailed study of 
(categorical and financial) eligibility for program participation (by state) for the March 1973 
CPS file and exact matched to the EM file were used (Projector and Murray 1980). 
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COmmeIlt  Robert Lampman 
This is a summary and discussion of  the paper by Budd, Radner, and 
Whiteman (B-R-W). 1 will  begin with  their  findings as presented  in 
section 2.4  of the paper. If we take their production-related income (PRI) 
concept as close to what most people would call pretransfer income, we 
see that they find what sounds familiar to readers of other studies. That is, 
first, transfers reduce inequality-they  double the share of  the lowest 
30% and reduce the share of  the upper half by  6%. Second, personal 
taxes paid (which exceed transfers received) further reduce inequality but 
only slightly. Thus household disposable income (HDI) is less unequal in 
distribution than is household income (HI) than is PRI. Further, leaving 
out retirement benefits, which are over two-thirds of  all transfers, hurts 
the share of  low-income households. 
The authors also state (and here we are in less familiar territory) that 
the Lorenz curves for PRI and primary income or earnings (EARN) 
intersect and reflect close to the same overall inequality. The difference 
between the two concepts is that PRI includes dividends, interest net of 
consumer interest paid, and estate and trust income. The authors suggest 
that the latter three items may be thought of as transfer income. Transfers 
received by  the personal  sector, including the three property income 
items, just  about equal the negative transfer  payments made  by  the 
personal sector. Compare lines 4 and 14 in table 2.2. The authors do 
comment on this near identity, but they do not supply any balancing items 
to equate transfers received and transfers paid. They do instruct us that 
".  . . for the economy as a whole,  although not  necessarily for any 
individual sector of  it, transfer payments simply redistribute claims to 
income  produced,  without  raising  the  total"  (section  2.1).  And 
". . . transfers enter only the income side of  the accounts and do not 
affect the product side"  (section 2.2.1). 
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Section 2.3 of the paper describes the process of producing the micro- 
data base underlying the findings summarized in section 2.4.  The amount 
of work involved in preparing this data base is truly awesome. It started 
with a matched set of records for a sample of households from CPS, IRS, 
and SSA records. Further information was grafted on to this sample from 
tax audits, the Consumer Expenditure Survey, the Survey of  Financial 
Characteristics of Consumers, and other sources. All items were brought 
into conformity with the totals in the NIPA after the latter were adjusted 
for the smaller population covered by CPS. (This explains why the totals 
in table 2.2 do not reconcile with those for similar concepts in NIPA.) 
One  wonders whether we should or will ever again have such a data file 
for another year.  One also wonders whether a single sample survey 
directed at pre- and post-transfer income could produce a data base that 
is as useful as this one. It should be noted that numerous items of interest 
for such a study are not yet estimated in the file. 
Section 2.2 is a presentation of  the B-R-W accounting framework for 
transfer payments. In designing such a framework, we must decide what 
sectoring is important, what income items (positive and negative) will be 
included, and what income period  is appropriate.  B-R-W accept the 
personal sector as it exists in NIPA except that they throw out nonprofit 
(philanthropic) organizations. This leaves families and unrelated indi- 
viduals, unincorporated business, estates and trusts, insurance and pen- 
sion funds in their “personal sector.” I suggest an alternative sectoring 
that would show separate sectors for families, an imaginary interfamily 
transfer fund, philanthropic organizations, and insurance and pensions. 
This would create a way to show transfers within the present personal 
sector as well as between that sector and the corporate business and 
government sectors. 
Transfer income (positive and negative) must be distinguished from 
income arising out of production or exchange and also from changes on 
capital account. Decisions must be made about what in-kind items are to 
be included as income and how far to go in imputing income where there 
is no transaction. In considering these matters, B-R-W point us to con- 
troversies among experts and to differences in accounting practice in 
BEA, the Census Bureau, and the UN. They also refer to the different 
income concepts now employed in income size distribution work (section 
2.2.9). 
Where do we get an income measure for family pretransfer income? 
National income (production at factor cost) would seem to be a logical 
beginning, but certain transfer items are taken out in the move from net 
national product to national income. Further, B-R-W reminds us that 
some components of national income, such as interest, are identified by 
some as “transfers arising out of the nature and distribution of ownership 
rights.” This classical view relies on a definition of production (nontrans- 85  Accounting Framework for Transfer Payments 
fer) income  as payment  for the  use  of  real  as opposed to financial 
resources. For most real business assets, which are located in the corpo- 
rate sector, the primary income payment goes to that sector. The pay- 
ment from the corporation to the stockholder and bondholder in the 
personal  sector  (who have  only provided  money)  is  a secondary or 
transfer income item. With respect to corporate paid interest, productive 
income flows to the asset and is no greater simply because the asset may 
be encumbered by a bond issue. This concept guides the UN system of 
accounts. Somewhat related to this is the notion that income items that 
have no counterpart on the product side-government  interest and con- 
sumer interest paid-should  be identified as transfers. 
Our search for a starting point of pretransfer income is not helped by 
going to personal income since that includes certain transfer payments 
and transfer contributions. We can get around this tangle by  defining 
pretransfer family income as income arising out of  market or two-way 
transactions, including certain financial transactions, where the income 
recipient provides something of value. This covers the case of the bond- 
holder. 
I have no great quarrel with the B-R-W concept of PRI as pretransfer 
income. That includes wages and salaries, proprietor’s income, net rental 
and royalty income, dividends and net interest received, and estate and 
trust income. They also say they would include capital gains and losses 
and employer contributions to social insurance and private insurance. 
Positive and negative transfer items are listed in lines 9, 10, 12, and 13 
in table 2.2. The positive transfers include some but not all public and 
private transfers. Some of these shown are in kind. The negative transfers 
shown are personal taxes only. The positive transfers amounted to $97.7 
billion, which is equal to 8%  of  GNP. By contrast, the total of  social 
welfare expenditures under public and private programs was equal to 
over 20%  of  GNP in that  same year.  This latter  series, which  was 
developed by  the Social Security Administration, includes education, 
health care, and other services not included in table 2.2.  B-R-W indicate 
that they would include some of these items if  they had more data in their 
file. I agree with them that an arbitrary decision must be made about what 
in-kind items should be counted as personal income. I would also like to 
include contributions to and from both philanthropic organizations and 
an imaginary interfamily fund. I would like to see a double-entry account 
of where the funds come from to pay for the transfers to families. In this 
connection, I assume that B-R-W would, if  they had the data, subtract 
employer contributions to social and private insurance in going from HI 
to HDI. 
B-R-W rightly point out that the income period is an important issue in 
accounting for transfers. This is true not only with respect to old-age- 
related benefits, which they emphasize, but also for certain other episodic 86  Edward C. Budd/Daniel B. Radner/T. Cameron Whiteman 
benefits, including education. Virtually the whole set of  transfers under 
consideration here can be considered as insurance or as a method of 
averaging payments over a long period for expenses that occur infre- 
quently. But when is the benefit actually experienced? Consider school- 
ing-does the benefit flow when one is a child in school or later in life? 
This raises questions about the equalizing effects of  transfers suggested 
by use of a one-year accounting period. Surely, a longer income period 
would show less equalization. 
The development of an accounting framework for transfers will require 
a consensus answer to the question: “Transfers for what?” If  we can 
center attention on the redistribution that leads to a meaningful and 
limited concept of  “consumer-power income,” then I think we can reach 
agreement on sectoring, distinguishing primary from secondary income, 
and selecting an income period. B-R-W have moved us a step closer to 
such a consensus. 